

Poplham in *The Independent* magazine looks at the history of the UDM ('Seduction and Betrayal').

18 October: *The Sunday Telegraph* publishes extracts from Con Coughlin's critical account of Terry Waite's attempts to free the Beirut hostages, *Hostages: The Complete Story of the Lebanon Captives* ('A Dangerous Obsession').

21 October: Peter Clarke in *The Independent* compares John Major's plight with that of past prime ministers ('Even The Tories are Saying it Now').

1 November: Zoe Heller in *The Independent* on *Sunday* profiles historian Norman Stone ('The Time of His Life').

12 November: Peter Riddell in *The Times* looks at the history of the Chancellor's Autumn statement.

1 December: Ben Pimlott in *The Independent* marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Beveridge Report with a call for a new initiative on social policy ('Giants of Poverty yet to be Slain'). Enoch Powell recalls the 'wartime determination to win the peace' and sees it as an 'age of innocence'.

2 December: all the papers report on the release of Whitehall documents revealing the extent of collaboration in the Channel Islands during the last war.

7 December: Richard Norton-Taylor in *The Guardian* reports on the appearance of a Second World War document which claims 'Pearl Harbor "Could Have Been Avoided"'.¹

Opinion Polling and the Aftermath of the 1992 General Election

COLIN RALLINGS and MICHAEL THRASHER

The Polls since the General Election

Despite meeting their 'Waterloo' at the general election in April 1992,¹ the opinion polls remain a familiar part of the political scene. The results of polls, which in many cases are part of series contracted before last April, continue to occupy editorial space in the commissioning newspapers and to be reported by the broadcast media. Moreover, their findings have been used to trace the dramatic fall in the government's popularity during the autumn of 1992 when scarcely a week went by without a new event or revelation which reflected badly on the stewardship of John Major and his team.

As Table 1 shows, the afterglow of the Conservative election victory lasted for less than five months. Although short, this honeymoon was in fact longer than that enjoyed by Margaret Thatcher in her first weeks in office in 1979. Then, following large and unexpected increases in indirect taxation, the government found itself behind in a Gallup poll conducted only one month after the election in May. In 1992, however, this period lasted long enough for the Conservatives to record their best local election performance for more than a decade,² and to prompt considerable popular and academic discussion about whether Britain now had a 'one party dominant' political system.

The first chinks in the armour coincided with press interest in the private life of the Heritage Secretary, David Mellor, and were highlighted by the publication of a MORI/Sunday Times poll on 2 August putting the Tories behind Labour for the first time since the general election. Since then only two ICM polls for *The Guardian*, using the new 'secret ballot' technique which we discuss later, have shown anything other than a Labour lead. The events of 16 September – 'Black Wednesday', when interest rates were raised sharply in a futile attempt to defend the pound's value and position within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, and public reaction to the announcement of the closure of 31 coal mines in October each seem to have had an incremental impact on the government's standing in the polls.

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² Contemporary Record, Vol. 7, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 187–197
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TABLE 1
OPINION POLLS PUBLISHED SINCE THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTION

Company/Client	Publication date	Sample size	CON	LAB	LIBDEM	Con lead
Harris/Observer	19-Apr	1021	44	36	17	8
MORI/S.Times	2-May	1873	43	38	16	5
ICM/Guardian	13-May	1465	46	36	14	10
Harris/Observer	17-May	1044	46	37	13	9
MORI/S.Times	31-May	1798	43	38	16	5
ICM/Guardian	10-Jun	1438	44	36	13	3
Harris/Observer	21-Jun	1071	46	36	15	10
MORI/S.Times	28-Jun	1868	42	39	16	3
ICM/Guardian	8-Jul	1438	45	39	12	6
Harris/Observer	19-Jul	1052	44	38	15	6
MORI/S.Times	2-Aug	1726	39	43	15	-4
ICM/Guardian	12-Aug	1467	41	40	14	1
MORI/S.Times	6-Sep	1535	41	44	13	-3
ICM/Guardian	10-Sep	1424	38	38	19	0
Harris/Observer	20-Sep	1060	36	41	16	-8
NOP/S.Independent	20-Sep	1063	39	44	16	-2
MORI/S.Times	20-Sep	1013	39	43	15	-4
Gallup/Telegraph	28-Sep	1070	37	42	17	-5
Gallup/Telegraph	5-Oct	1074	37	44	15	-7
MORI/S.Times	4-Oct	1910	37	43	16	-6
ICM/Guardian	14-Oct	1445	38	42	16	-4
MORI/S.Times	1-Nov	1784	35	45	15	-10
NOP/S.Independent	1-Nov	1061	34	47	14	-13
ICM/Guardian	12-Nov	1441	34	43	17	-9
HARRIS/WIA	16-Nov	1084	30	53	13	-23
Harris/Observer	15-Nov	1077	32	51	14	-19
ICM/D. Express	23-Nov	1003	33	49	14	-16
Gallup/Telegraph	4-Dec	1026	29	52	14	-23
MORI/S.Times	6-Dec	1744	34	47	15	-13
ICM/Guardian	9-Dec	1410	33	45	16	-12
MORI/S.Times	27-Dec	1832	34	47	16	-13
ICM/Guardian	14-Jan	1463	38	42	15	-4
Gallup/Telegraph	14-Jan	1073	33.5	45.5	14.5	-12
MORI/S.Times	31-Jan	1929	37	45	14	-8
Gallup/Telegraph	5-Feb	1197	33.5	46	15.5	-13

By the end of the year Labour was receiving support from more than 50 per cent of those interviewed in some polls, and the party's lead over the Conservatives matched that recorded during the most bitter months of opposition to the 'poll tax' in 1990. This time, however, the fact that the government recovered from such a position comfortably to win an election within two years, and that the victory was achieved contrary to the forecasts of the polls, has not been lost on observers. Even the Labour Party now accepts that poll leads of such a magnitude have no bearing on the 1996/97 general election. Many of those polled are registering their disquiet with government policy and the state of the economy rather than giving a considered answer to the highly hypothetical question 'If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?'. There is evidence that Labour's own private qualitative surveys during the 1992 campaign 'failed to provide encouragement, even when the opinion polls reported a Labour lead,³ and more recent party research has reinforced this point. In January 1993 *The Guardian* leaked an internal report showing Labour still to have an outdated image and to not be trusted by the electorate. The party would lose any election held 'tomorrow' despite its apparent 20 per cent lead in the polls.⁴ The reduction in Labour's average poll lead since the beginning of 1993 only serves to emphasise the point.

Campaign Polling in 1992 - What Went Wrong?

The Labour Party's scepticism about the polls is an understandable reaction to their failure to win an election they had been encouraged to believe they could not lose. Equally mortified by the outcome were those media outlets who had spent considerable sums of money on polling and whose editorial coverage was shaped by what they believed the polls were telling them. As one senior journalist put it, 'That weekend (April 4th/5th) we began planning on how we would cover a Labour government'.⁵ In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the post-mortem on the polls has spawned an industry in its own right. What we intend to do here is to provide a lay guide to the differing explanations and analyses that have been offered as to why 'the polls have a lot to answer for!'⁶

In very broad terms such explanations can be divided into two, rather different but not wholly incompatible types. On the one hand, there is a widespread belief that the Conservatives benefited from a very late swing in their favour among electors too late to be caught by the final pre-election polls, but highlighted by the better showing by the Tories in the exit polls. However, although a late swing is universally acknowledged to have played a part, some commentators have suggested that 'almost

certainly ... the Conservatives (were) slightly but consistently ahead during the campaign and possibly for some months before'.⁷ The implication being, of course, that something more fundamental led the polls to misrepresent the true state of public opinion throughout.

The most systematic enquiry into the discrepancy between the polling figures and the actual election result has been carried out by the Market Research Society.⁸ They, and others, dismissed the likelihood that various technical factors to do with the number or type of people included or excluded from the electoral register might have led to the opinion poll samples being significantly unrepresentative of the actual electorate. They also took issue with the idea that sampling error, to which all polls are subject, might have been to blame. Sampling error is, by definition, random in both the extent to which it occurs and the direction in which it falls. The whole point in 1992 was that all the polls were telling the same story and that it was the story that was wrong.

The Market Research Society report accepts that there was a late swing to the Conservatives, enough they believe to account for up to 3 per cent of the 8.5 per cent discrepancy between the actual Tory lead and that reported in the final polls. Detailed post-election research by the pollsters themselves and by the academic community has shown:

- (1) that more Conservative voters made up their minds how to vote on election day or during the last week of the campaign than was the case at previous elections;⁹
- (2) that three independent matched samples within MORI's final poll for *The Times* indicate that 'the Tuesday night sample was considerably more Labour inclined than the interviews done on the Wednesday';¹⁰
- (3) that 'Labour's private polls recorded a slippage of support in the final days';¹¹ and
- (4) that 'a systematic change in ... perceptions ... occurred between 7-8 and 10-11 April' according to analysis of Gallup pre- and post-election polls.¹²

Similar analyses also demonstrate that those people who before the election were unwilling to disclose their voting intention to pollsters were in fact disproportionately likely to have cast their ballot for the Conservatives.¹³ According to the MRS report the combination of all these factors allows us to 'understand around 5% of the discrepancy between the polls and the result in terms of the Conservative lead'.¹⁴

The remaining part of the explanation must be sought by asking more far-reaching questions about the methodology of the polls. For some researchers indeed even the MRS Inquiry may be understating the problem. Preliminary evidence from the British General Election Study

shows the Conservatives to have been consistently ahead by a margin of up to 7.3 per cent in its pre-election panel polls, and its authors argue that 'any late gains by the Conservatives were indeed very modest'.¹⁵ They go on to present the case for a fundamental re-think of how opinion polls select their respondents and how they gather and use information from them.

The issue is one of both sampling and questioning the right people and of maximising the material gleaned from them. Some pollsters, for example, have expressed concern that the quotas currently set are not sophisticated enough to pick out political differences among respondents within the same class or social group. Self-employment and newspaper readership have both been shown by recent research to be related to party choice within social class,¹⁶ and could be used with some profit further to refine quotas. The argument about whether it is best to interview in the street or at the respondent's home continues, but in 1992 an additional factor came to light when the only published surveys conducted solely at home and during the weekend produced Conservative leads contrary to the pattern of all the other polls. However, Robert Waller of Harris, whose company was responsible for these polls, remains of the view that they do 'not add up to sufficient evidence to claim superiority for weekend polling in home'.¹⁷

However, of perhaps equal importance to choosing an accurate sample frame is the need to reduce the number of individuals who refuse to give an interview or who refuse to answer all the questions asked. One pollster has revealed that as many as 50 per cent of those people approached will refuse to co-operate in an opinion poll.¹⁸ As yet there is no evidence of a clear difference in the attitudes of those who do and do not make themselves available as survey subjects, but any such difference could easily skew the results. In 1992, if the refusers were as heavily Conservative as the non-disclosers proved to be, then a further considerable part of the discrepancy in the polls begins to reveal itself. Moreover, if the number of outright refusers increases over time, as it may well do given trends in society, then it represents a potential timebomb ticking away beneath the findings of all survey research.

The problem of those who will not reveal or simply do not know or are undecided about their voting intention is more amenable to amelioration. The usual practice has been effectively to ignore them; to assume their preferences take a similar pattern to those of co-operating respondents; and to use a lower base number when percentageing the levels of party support. For example, if in a survey of 1,000 respondents, 85 are unwilling to state their party preference, the share of support for each party is calculated on the basis of a sample of 915. However, it has been

suggested that measures can be taken either to reduce the number of non-disclosers and/or to make 'guessimates' about the likely preferences of those respondents who give incomplete information. ICM have begun to use a secret ballot technique in their opinion polls whereby respondents are asked to specify their preferred party on a separate sheet of paper and to return it to the interviewer in a sealed envelope. Post-election research found this to reduce the number of refusals and to increase the proportion revealing a preference.¹⁹ However, other polling companies dispute either that it makes the difference claimed or that any difference will always advantage the Conservatives.²⁰

There has also been discussion of the desirability of using 'surrogate' indicators of party support in the case of those respondents for whom there is no clear voting intention data. Attitudinal questions, and those relating to past support and party identification, could help researchers to assign to individuals a probability of their voting for any one party. In particular it is argued that a close study of voters' economic interests and perceptions may provide clues to their electoral choice quite independent of the party they profess to support.²¹ Such an approach has many pitfalls, but would be nothing like as controversial as moving to a system of 'political weighting'. At present all pollsters weight their data by factors such as gender, age and social class to ensure that their interviewed sample is representative of whatever population they are studying. 'Political weighting' implies that you know that one party or another will be under-represented in any sample and that you compensate for this in analysing your results. If it is believed that in 1992 a significant proportion of putative Conservative supporters were reluctant to reveal their hand, then such weighting would have made the polls more 'correct'. However, it cannot be assumed that such weighting should always be used to bolster the Conservatives and it would be a brave, or foolhardy, polling organisation which stuck its neck out and applied a political weight in advance of a general election.²²

The attempt to explain and remedy the failure of the polls at the 1992 general election has already generated a lot of material. There will be more to come as the opinion pollsters, the Market Research Society and the Royal Statistical Society all continue to analyse the problem; to test solutions; and to publish more detailed reports on their findings. For understandable professional reasons all these bodies are concerned to get it right next time. However, perhaps the most intriguing possibility of the story told by the polls during the campaign has been pin-pointed by Ivor Crewe. He notes that the polls in recent elections have tended to overstate the lead of the party which appeared to be winning. By putting Labour out in front in 1992, they 'probably helped the Conservatives ...

to mobilise their faint hearts ... and to create Conservative government ... Had they correctly placed the Conservatives ahead, they would have made a hung Parliament ... a more likely outcome'.²³

Exit Polls and Seat Forecasts

A rather different set of polls which came nearer to getting the result right, but which were still deemed to have 'failed' in the public eye, were the 'exit polls'. Many commentators, including some of those referred to above, appear to be labouring under a misapprehension about the role and use of these polls and it seems worthwhile to try to set the record straight.

Three exit polls intended for public dissemination were conducted at the 1992 general election: by National Opinion Polls on behalf of the BBC; by Harris for ITN; and by ICM for *The Sun* newspaper.²⁴ The methodologies adopted by the polls for the broadcasting companies were broadly similar in that two different types of information were gathered. In the first place a large number of randomly selected respondents in specific marginal constituencies were asked, on leaving the polling station, anonymously to complete a 'ballot paper' to show how they had just voted. The purpose of this was to enable the pollsters and their clients to forecast the number of seats each party would win by allowing for the possibility either that marginal constituencies would behave differently from those held safely by any party and/or that there would be regional differences in the movement of voters. Under the British electoral system the result in more than 400 of the 651 constituencies is effectively 'known' before the election has taken place: the job of the forecaster is to predict the result in the other 200. This poll, known as the 'prediction poll', was not intended and indeed could not be used for producing a *national* share of the vote.

Both NOP and Harris also each carried out an entirely separate survey. These comprised lengthy questionnaires intended to ascertain from respondents details of how they had voted and why and of their demographic characteristics. In each case more than 4,500 people were interviewed in order to produce a national sample of those who had voted. In that sense they were akin to a conventional opinion poll. However, these 'analysis polls' were not intended to be used to forecast the composition of the House of Commons, and although ITN did broadcast the national share of the vote suggested by its analysis poll, the BBC did not. Indeed, the BBC had made an editorial decision before election day not to do so.²⁵ The ICM/*Sun* exit poll, also based on a self-completion 'secret ballot', was less complex in design and inevitably more prone to error. First, it

comprised simply a very large sample of those voting from which a national share of the vote could be derived. This national share of the vote was then translated into a projection of the composition of the House of Commons based on the assumption of uniform, or at least counter-balancing swing. Only in Northern Ireland and in a dozen mainland constituencies was the projected result set to override the predictions generated by the computer programme. Second, and in order to comply with the desire of the clients to have a 'result' ready to print in their first edition, interviewing stopped at 4 p.m. by which time two-fifths of those who were to vote had not yet done so. Any difference in voting preference between those voting early and those voting late in the day would thus have serious consequences for such a poll, and indeed both the BBC and ITN surveys show that the Labour share of the vote recorded in the exit poll returns had a tendency to fall as the day went on.⁵⁶

Many of the methodological problems which appear to have faced the campaign polls also apply to the 'exit polls', but in two important ways their data are different. In the first place, by interviewing respondents immediately they have left the polling station, they are recording reported behaviour rather than intention. They are thus freed from the potentiality of errors due to poorly predicted or differential turnout or to late swing. In addition, by offering respondents a chance to cast their votes again in secret, they are hoping to reduce biases in the refusal rate. However, this latter problem still looks to have been very damaging for the projection polls in particular and can help to explain their over-prediction of the likely Labour vote. In that sense, therefore, the exit polls got it less wrong because their methods were less prone to error than the campaign polls, but they still got it wrong because there were unintended biases in the way they collected their information.

In the opinion of some commentators, however, it was not the exit polls as such that were at fault, but the way they were interpreted by the broadcasters and their psephologists. This criticism has been most consistently and trenchantly made by Robert Worcester,⁵⁷ but it appears to us to be based on a fundamental misconception. The shares of the national vote produced by both the BBC/NOP and the ITN/Harris exit polls were not designed for use in seat projections. Although the figures available at the close of polls at 10 p.m. each showed the Conservatives four points ahead of Labour, it is only with hindsight that one can say that a projection based on such figures would have given an accurate forecast of the House of Commons. Moreover, the right result would have been obtained with inaccurate data because the eventual Conservative lead was twice that suggested by the 'analysis' polls. In fact, applying the

change in the actual national share of the vote between 1992 and 1987 uniformly across all constituencies would have resulted in a forecast of a Conservative majority of 71!⁵⁸

The reason for this discrepancy was that swing was not uniform and, in particular, that the marginals did behave differently. The problem for the 'projection' exit polls was that they produced an expectation not simply that Labour would do better in the marginals – they did, but that they would prosper more than proved to be the case – see Table 2. If the figures fed into either the BBC or ITN computers for the marginal seats had been right, then so would have been the prediction.⁵⁹ Much more accurate, indeed, than a similar treatment of the actual share of the vote figures – see Table 3.

TABLE 2

EXIT POLLS AND THE ACTUAL RESULT IN CONSERVATIVE/LABOUR MARGINALS

	Conservative	Labour	LibDem
ITN/Harris exit poll in Con/Lab marginals	-2.4	+8.1	-6.6
Actual result in those marginals	-0.7	+6.4	-6.6
BBC/NOP exit poll in Con/Lab marginals	-3.1	+8.4	-6.5
Actual result in those marginals	-0.9	+6.9	-6.9

TABLE 3

SEAT PROJECTIONS BASED ON ACCURATE POLLING IN THE EXIT POLL MARGINALS

	Conservative	Labour	LibDem	Other
ITN model	329	270	25	27
BBC model	338	265	24	24
Actual result	336	271	20	24

The only sense in which anything approaching the 'jiggery-pokery' of which Worcester has accused the broadcasters and their psephologists took place was in the treatment of 'special seats'. Both the BBC and ITN took the view that there were a number of constituencies where special factors meant that the electorate was likely to behave in a way which any model based on exit poll projections could not encompass. Prior judgments, themselves inevitably influenced by the prevailing pre-election poll data, were therefore made about the outcome – in 41 cases for ITN and in 45 for the BBC. In this process both broadcasters proved to have overestimated the likely performance of the Liberal Democrats and the

Scottish National Party and thus compounded the error in their projections. However, the contribution of this practice to the overall error was small and, it has to be said, a failure to 'handset' the result in such constituencies would have led to more serious underestimation of the number of Liberal Democrat victories.

Whilst it is easy to explain why the initial broadcast forecasts of the result were wide of the mark, the BBC and ITN have also been criticised for being slow to adjust their prediction in the light of actual results coming in from the constituencies. In particular, and again with the benefit of hindsight, the third result to be declared at Basildon at just after 11.30 p.m. has been pinpointed as the moment when victory for the Conservatives looked secure. However, it was not until almost two hours later that the two rival networks began to forecast a Conservative overall majority.³⁰

In fact, Basildon was a poor result for Labour even in the context of a disappointing night, and a forecast based on that outcome alone would have predicted a Conservative majority of more than 50. To guard against the excessive influence of such atypical results both broadcasters had built into their forecasting programmes weights and parameters whereby results coming in from different parts of the country would only gradually begin to supercede the exit poll in their impact on the predicted election outcome. Although ditching the exit poll altogether was, of course, an available editorial option, other marginal constituencies which declared in the hour and a half following Basildon proved more favourable to Labour with individual swings of up to eight per cent. Under these circumstances it was understandable that there was caution about calling a Conservative overall majority. Post-mortems of the forecasting procedures will ponder long and hard on how the weighting could be changed or the selecting of special seats further refined. The real problem with the 1992 exit polls, however, like their campaign cousins, was that they told a false story and that fact, rather than in-house 'jiggery-pokery', was why the broadcasters on the night of 9/10 April led the public to believe that the result would be much closer than proved to be the case.

NOTES

1. D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1992* (London: Macmillan, 1992), Ch. 7.
2. See C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, *Local Elections Handbook 1992* (Plymouth: Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre, 1992).
3. Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1992*, p. 151.
4. *The Guardian*, 5 Jan. 1993, p. 1.
5. I. Fallon in I. Fallon and R. Worcester, 'The Use of Panel Studies in British General

- Elections', Paper presented to Conference on Political Communications and the British General Election of 1992, University of Essex, Sept. 1992.
6. The title of R. Worcester, 'The Polls Have a Lot to Answer For!', *Contemporary Record*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1992, pp. 356-76.
7. I. Crewe, 'A Nation of Liars? Opinion Polls and the 1992 Election', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1992), pp. 475-95.
8. *Inquiry into the Performance of the Polls in the 1992 General Election* (London: Market Research Society, June 1992).
9. D. Cowling, *ITN Political Bulletin*, May 1992, p. 4.
10. Worcester, 'The Polls Have a Lot to Answer For!', p. 369.
11. Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1992*, p. 143.
12. D. Sanders, 'Why the Conservative Party Won - Again', in A. King (ed.), *Britain at the Polls 1992* (London: Chatham House, 1993), p. 208.
13. See *Results of Tests to Improve Voting Intention Polls* (London: ICM Research, 1992), p. 9; R. Jowell *et al.*, 'The 1992 British Election: The Failure of the Polls', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, forthcoming (1993).
14. MRS. Jowell, p. 8.
15. Jowell *et al.*, 'The 1992 British Election', p. 2.
16. See A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, *How Britain Votes* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985), Ch. 2 and R. Webber, 'The 1992 General Election: Voting Results and Local Patterns of National Newspaper Readership', in D. Denver, P. Norris, D. Broughton and C. Rallings (eds.), *British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1993* (London: Simon & Schuster, forth-coming).
17. R. Waller, 'The Polls and the 1992 General Election', Paper presented to Conference on Political Communications and the British General Election of 1992, University of Essex, Sept. 1992.
18. N. Moon, 'National Opinion Polls', mimeo.
19. *Results of Tests to Improve Voting Intention Polls*, p. 10.
20. See Moon, 'National Opinion Polls' and the interview with Robert Worcester on Channel 4's 'A Week in Politics', 16 Jan. 1993.
21. See the discussion in Sanders, 'Why the Conservative Party Won - Again' and D. Studlar and I. McAllister, 'A Changing Political Agenda?' *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1992).
22. For a fuller discussion of this topic see Waller, 'The Polls and the 1992 General Election'. He argues that as recently as 1983 Labour was the party disadvantaged by a disproportionate number of supporters who would not reveal their party preference.
23. Crewe, 'A Nation of Liars? Opinion Polls and the 1992 Election', p. 493.
24. Contrary to common belief BSKyB was NOT a co-client for this poll.
25. J. Curtice and C. Payne, 'Forecasting the 1992 Election: The BBC Experience', Paper presented to Conference on Political Communication and the British General Election of 1992, University of Essex, Sept. 1992.
26. J. Curtice and Payne, 'Forecasting the 1992 Election'; D. Cowling, *ITN Political Bulletin*, April 1992, p. 1.
27. See Worcester, 'The Polls Have a Lot to Answer For!' and his letter to *The Independent*, 5 May 1992.
28. Curtice and Payne, 'Forecasting the 1992 Election', p. 3.
29. G. Mathias, 'The ITN Exit Poll', Paper presented to Conference on Political Communications and the British General Election of 1992, University of Essex, Sept. 1992.
30. The much smaller and less well-resourced BSKyB operation forecast a Conservative majority from 12.50 a.m. based on the projection of actual results within a regional control. However, because they did not give any particular weight to the results from the marginals, they over-estimated the likely Conservative majority by up to 30 seats for part of the night.